IS THE INTERNET OVER?! (AGAIN?)1
JAMES BOYLE†

About 30 years ago, in March of 1989, a British man wrote a
memo to his boss. The memo had the remarkably boring title,
Information Management: A Proposal. It looked like this2:
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The memo came back with his boss’s annotation on it. “Vague
but exciting…”
Both adjectives were well-chosen. The man was Tim BernersLee. Now Sir Tim Berners-Lee. The proposal? Oh, nothing big. Just the
World Wide Web. Berners-Lee’s memo was something that started as a
proposal for information management inside of CERN, the European
Nuclear Research organization, and became the framework for the World
Wide Web. You know, those three little letters in your browser bar?
WWW?
Dispensing with the cumbersome protocols of the time, BernersLee envisioned a web of information, linked together by a language
called html (hypertext markup language), a precise geography provided
by Uniform Resource Identifiers (think the URL’s of web addresses) and
finally a method of transfer, http (the hypertext transfer protocol that you
can still see in the address of the sites in your web browser). By 1990 he
had written each of these protocols.
I teach at a law school that has world-class faculty and brilliant
students. Their breadth of learning humbles me on a daily basis. But
many of them do not understand the network architecture that is so
central to their lives. Of course, it is not their specialty. Yet they
understand the basic explanation of anthropogenic climate-change, the
idea of externalities in economics, the broad strokes of the history of
civil rights in the United States, the debate about whether minimum
wages are good for poor workers and the issues raised by the use of
drones in armed conflict. They fluently invoke the concept of noir
cinema and make jokes about magical realist fiction when a faculty
meeting turns bizarre. They are, in short, profoundly well-rounded,
educated people, knowledgeable beyond their own specialties. But they
do not really understand the internet or the world wide web. That is a
shame.
It is a shame because understanding the most important
communications network of our time, the network for our culture and
news and search and flirting and shopping and politics, is central to
knowing how—or whether—to regulate it. To build on it. To use it. As I
will try to explain, some of the features of the internet that its critics view
as its main problems—anonymity, the fact that anyone can connect to the
internet and say anything, the difficulty of filtering it or managing it, its
decentralized anarchic governance—are also among its transformative
and engaging features. It is a shame for us not to understand all this
because the network that shapes our cognitive world, defines our
markets, and runs our infrastructure is as important as the rest of the
things a “well-rounded person” knows about. But it is also a shame
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because Berners-Lee’s idea was beautiful. It was an idea that a scholar
would come up with and that a scholar would love. Now it is central to
our world. Yet somehow it progressed from bizarre novelty to essential
utility without ever passing through the intermediate stage of public
comprehension.
Berners-Lee imagined a republic of ideas built on a vision of
language. The whole thing had a whiff of Harry Potter magic. To click
on the hyperlink was to summon its referent. The name was the magical
command for the presence of the resource, as though every footnote
animated itself, went to the library and brought you back the relevant
book. To write a web page was to build a transporter of the mind. The
link was a reference to the resource, a map to the place where the
resource was held and a vehicle to take you there. Each new document
wove the network a little wider and tighter. That’s why they called it the
world wide web. And its architecture was “distributed.” Anyone could
build the web—as if we could all wander outside our houses and build
the Eisenhower freeways of the mind ourselves, draw the maps that
chronicled those freeways, assemble the cars that traveled along them
and then construct the libraries, bookstores, shops, coffee houses and red
light districts to which they journeyed. All done through a decentralized
process that required neither governmental permission, nor
authentication of your content—for better or worse. Better and worse.
The network had no central controller, no authority that must
authenticate or vet, no central node through which all connections
passed. Writing back in 1997, I tried to summarize the attraction of this
architecture to libertarians, starting with the famous quotation “The Net
interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”
This quote from John Gilmore, one of the founders of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, has the twin advantages of being pithy and
technologically accurate. The Internet[’s] . . . distributed
architecture and its technique of packet switching were designed to
get messages delivered despite blockages, holes, and malfunctions.
Imagine the poor censor faced with such a system. There is no
central exchange to seize and hold; messages actively “seek out”
alternative routes so that even if one path is blocked another may
open up. Here was the civil libertarian’s dream: a technology with a
comparatively low cost of entry to speakers and listeners alike,
technologically resistant to censorship, yet politically and
economically important enough that it cannot easily be ignored. The
Internet offers obvious advantages to the countries, research
communities, cultures, and companies that use it, but it is extremely
hard to control the amount and type of information available; access
is like a tap that only has two settings–“off” and “full.” For
governments, this has been seen as one of the biggest problems
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posed by the Internet. To the Internet’s devotees, most of whom
embrace some variety of libertarianism, the Internet’s structural
resistance to censorship, or any externally imposed filtration, is “not
a bug but a feature.”3

It was not merely the network’s distributed nature or its
resistance to censorship that attracted attention. It was the degree of
freedom it gave its users. The network imposed no barriers to what could
pass over its fibers, so long as that content could be broken down into
packets. It was based on an “end-to-end architecture.” It imposed no
judgment about what would be done at either end of its connections. This
was not just a network of terminals, like many of its earlier digital
antecedents such as Ceefax or Minitel. It did not limit connection to
devices hardwired to perform only a few defined functions, such as an
ATM or an airline check-in kiosk. The ATM will not give you the
weather and the check-in kiosk cannot produce pictures of your
grandchildren.4 Terminal design = control of user. This is the genius of
Larry Lessig’s focus on architecture as regulation. But this was not a
network of terminals. If you plugged in a general purpose computer at
either end of this network, you could do whatever software on a general
purpose computer could do. Chat? Music? Video remix? Flirting?
Arranging calendars? Generating knitting patterns? Doing facial
recognition or portfolio analysis? Making a tribute to a departed loved
one? Looking in on your babysitter while you are on a date? Managing
just-in-time inventory through the same system that handled your
customer orders? Generating encrypted communications that your
despotic government could not read? Creating a message board on which
you discovered that you were not in fact the only gay teenager in the
world, it just seemed that way? So long as the software could be written

3

James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty and
Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 178–79 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
To be fair, all of this was in the context of criticizing the naivete of hardcore
digital libertarianism. Even back then academic commentators, including me,
stressed that such claims relied on a form of technological essentialism—
assuming that the current form of the network was in some sense canonical—
and stressed the possibility of “hard wired censors” which could in fact tame the
supposedly unregulable internet. The best example of those hard wired censors
was to be the Great Firewall of China. Id.; More importantly, see LAWRENCE
LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). Since we were among
naïve libertarianism’s principal critics, it is mildly annoying to have the views
we criticized attributed to us.
4
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rebooting the router.
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and the information broken into packets, those packets could be sent and
received anywhere in the world.
It was a world-changing technology, a world-changing idea. Yes,
of course, we immediately used it for porn, copyright infringement, spam
and videos of cats. We are human. We build glorious cathedrals and then
scribble illiterate graffiti on their walls. But it could do so much more,
and it did. And thirty years ago, it did not exist. In 1991, people outside
of CERN were invited to use this new network. Think about that for a
moment. For all intents and purposes, the web that is so central to every
aspect of your lives today did not exist at all until 1991. Maybe 1994, if
you talk about mediumly-widespread public use. It is as if I told you that
no one had thought of roads, or wheels, or air, until 25 years ago.
There had been “an internet,” true. There had been packetswitched network precursors or ancestors, depending on how one does
one’s digital zoological classification. The first message was sent over
ARPANET in 1969. TCP/IP—the protocols that collectively allow data
to be broken into packets, addressed, transmitted and reassembled—had
been written for ARPANET under the auspices of DARPA in the 70’s.
Berners-Lee’s genius was to come up with the idea—and it was as much
an idea or a language as it was a technology—that made all of the
(brilliant, visionary) earlier development something that now everyone
was going to want to use, dispute, monetize, subvert, romanticize and
demonize.
There was one more vital thing about the web that the digerati
found noteworthy. It was built on a commons. Actually, it was built on a
series of layers, each a commons or semi-commons, in which key aspects
of the layer were free from the kind of control that proprietary ownership
would have conveyed.
First, the network. With a proprietary network like AOL
(America OnLine) or CompuServe, the owner controls what and who can
become part of the network. There is a right to exclude. With the web
and the internet, the reverse was true. So long as you had the money to
purchase a domain name, so long as you could create or rent a presence
on a server connected to the internet, you were online, with control over
your own site and your own content. In that sense, access was a
commons—regulated, if at all, by the strictures and guidelines of the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)5 or the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). But those strictures were largely
technical in nature, setting up the federated set of internet domain name
registrars, and a process for resolving trademark disputes over domain
5

See generally James Boyle, A Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital Age?, 50
DUKE L.J. 5 (2000).
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names, or specifying the common metadata language through which web
pages were to express themselves. True, you had to pay a minimal fee to
get a domain name and if you coded your webpage in non-standard html
then it would not display properly. In that sense, there was control. But
there was no proprietary network owner to grant or deny access.
Second, the protocols by which the network operated were also a
commons. For example, TCP/IP tries to make sure that the packets you
are sending end up at the right place, in the right order. If packets are
missed or dropped, it retransmits. But no one owns or controls TCP/IP. It
achieved dominance precisely because it was not a proprietary system
subject to intellectual property rights, but rather a commons that was
open to all. And Berners-Lee’s protocols—the suite that included html,
http and URLs—were left open as well, by explicit choice. Partly that
was because he believed he was building on the work of those who went
before him. Partly it was because he wanted this to be a resource held in
common-like language. And that openness enabled others to standardize
around its protocols without fear of holdup or control at a later stage.
After describing how Berners-Lee worked at CERN in Switzerland
back in the 1980s, Doan moved on to the web. When Berners-Lee
invented the web, did he apply for a patent on it, Doan asked.
“No,” said Berners-Lee.
“Why not?” asked Doan.
“The internet was already around. I was taking hypertext, and it was
around a long time too. I was taking stuff we knew how to do…. All
I was doing was putting together bits that had been around for years
in a particular combination to meet the needs that I have.”
Doan: “And who owns the web?”
Berners-Lee: “We do.”
....
“. . . The reason the Web took off is not because it was a magic
idea, but because I persuaded everyone to use HTML and HTTP.”6

Finally, by custom, nudge and occasional resort to administrative
fiat, it was assumed that the network was and should be ‘neutral.’
Operators of one layer, for example your internet service provider,
should be forbidden from discriminating between different sources of
content of the same digital type. Video and audio streams can be treated
differently than text, of course, because simultaneity, synching and speed
6

Joe Mullin, Tim Berners-Lee Takes the Stand to Keep the Web Free, WIRED
(Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.wired.com/2012/02/tim-berners-lee-patent/.
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are more important there. But my ISP should not be able to prioritize
different sources of content, sending me Youtube videos twice as fast as
to its competitors for example, or streaming Amazon Prime videos at a
higher rate than Netflix. The fear here was that network effects could be
used to create dominant positions and thus to solidify incumbents, or to
give priority to the content provided by large, vertically integrated
communications companies with extensive portfolios of content. Imagine
the process of Facebook trying to unseat Myspace as the dominant social
network, for example, if Myspace could pay all service-providers to
throttle Facebook’s content or boost its own. Imagine if only TimeWarner’s videos played on the cable networks their parent company
owned. The idea here was profoundly anti-incumbent, against barriers to
entry.
The effects were cumulative. Together, the end-to-end principle
of network design, the censorship-resistant architecture of a packetswitched system, the open access provided by its layers of commons, and
the traffic-equality mandate of net-neutrality7 seemed to offer an opening
for both anti-authoritarian politics and disruptive commerce: If one could
“think as one wished, and speak as one thought,” to quote our colleague
David Lange, and if a disruptive business idea could instantly reach
world-wide without being squashed by the incumbent dinosaurs, then
both economic and political liberty would have gained a powerful ally.
The cheering was not only from the civil libertarian or the Ayn
Rand sectors of the arena. By lowering the barriers to collaboration, the
web promised to allow new forms of creativity—from Wikipedia to open
source software. Many of these new forms of creativity were themselves
built on a network composed of layers of commons and yielded a
resource that itself was a commons; think of Linux or Wikipedia, articles
or software created by strangers and released under a license that
permitted copying and remix. And these forms of creation could take
place outside or beside the dominant forms of commodified creativity,
perhaps challenging our ideas about where intellectual property rights
were necessary to incentivize innovation, perhaps sometimes adding a
tertium quid between work and play, between homo economicus and
homo ludens. The central reference here is Yochai Benkler’s work on the
way in which the network should change our economic assumptions, and
particularly our assumptions about the possibility of commons-based
creativity.8

7

Hat tip, Tim Wu, the inventor of the phrase.
See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Yochai Benkler,
8
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It was in the context of all of this, that John Perry Barlow wrote
the essays that are the subject of this symposium. How should we grade
his prognostications today? Selling Wine Without Bottles probably stands
up best to the test of time. Barlow was right that the internet would pose
a challenge to the current forms of distribution of copyrighted content.
He was right that encryption would eventually provide the “bottles”
around the content we receive; every Pandora stream or Netflix video
comes to you wrapped in walls made of code. He was right that the
network would bring a focus on timeliness, on personal and
uncommodifiable perspective, on relationships other than those of buyer
and seller. This is an insight that affects every influencer on social media,
every columnist who draws you to the New York Times rather than the
Huffington Post, every band that builds a cadre of loyal fans who come
to its concerts and buy its merchandise and vinyl releases. He was right
to say that the availability of perfect digital copies on demand would
actually make the original live experience seem more valuable, not less.9
One can see this both from the growing proportion of musical revenues
generated by live performances and by the increasing number of those
performances over time. He was at least partially right that ethics and
law were becoming increasingly out of joint.
Widespread file-sharing of copyrighted works without
authorization is illegal in the United States and breaking the law is a bad
thing. Yet to the Napster generation it did not seem as if that were true.
In our law school parking lot it is equally illegal to park in the fire lanes
and, if one is not entitled to do so, in the handicapped spaces. My lawabiding, law professor colleagues freely park in the first when the lot is
full. I’ve never seen them park in the second. For a while, file-sharing
was seen like parking illegally to run a quick errand10—running some
risk of sanction but carrying no negative moral force. If illicit
downloading were an exercise in bold civil disobedience that would be
one thing, but this was—for the most part—just wanting to get away
with getting the music without paying. That seems like a bad thing both
for the legitimacy of law and for the backlash it would reliably generate:
massive overreactions in attempting to regulate the network to make it

Coase’s Penguin: or Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369
(2002).
9
Cf. WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS 217 (1968). This is a much-cited essay which
is deep, insightful and completely wrong on this specific point.
10
To defend my colleagues, the fire-lanes are large enough for the Starship
Enterprise to land on them. Still, the disparity is remarkable.
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more tractable, running the risk of destroying many of its most attractive
attributes in the process.11
Barlow was also right about one cure for lawlessness. People
will pay for convenient, cheap, legal access. Ten years ago, file sharing
was a principal source of music for the student demographic. Today
almost all of my students got their music from legal streaming services.
He was also right that it would take a long time for the music industry to
accept that the old model was dead and that the intellectual property law
would actually make it quite hard to create a multijurisdictional, legal,
music streaming service. “Legal efforts to keep the old boat floating are
taking three forms: a frenzy of deck chair rearrangement, stern warnings
to the passengers that if she goes down, they will face harsh criminal
penalties, and serene, glassy-eyed denial.”12 The long delay in the rollout
of reasonably priced legal sources of digital music can indeed be
attributed both to industry denial, and to the barriers that 100 years of
copyright law, built up technology by technology and licensing stream
by licensing stream, put in the way of the one-stop-shop service.
Barlow was not right everywhere. He underestimated the ability
of law to adapt, and to incentivize private actors to make compliance
more profitable than illegality. His vision of property law lacks some of
the Hohfeldian, bundle-of-rights, complexity the legal system actually
has. He overestimated the idea that the web would be a community with
its own ethics—something that might be true for a small group of first
adopters, but is harder to sustain when the network contains most of the
population of the world.
What about A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace?
This document—a deliberate provocation of the global elite at Davos13—
invites pushback. The full-throated claim that “cyberspace” could and
should be a self-governing entity, free from state power, organized only
by the dictates of custom and the Golden Rule is an easy, and
appropriate, target for critique. When linked to the techno-libertarian
slogans I quoted earlier such as “the Net interprets censorship as damage
and routes around it,” it seems to substantiate the idea that these were a
group of people who thought that the technology would automatically
provide freedom, which would thereafter self-regulate.
11

This is a theme that Pam Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto explore at length
in their contribution to this volume, The Enigma of Digitized Property: A
Tribute to John Perry Barlow, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 103 (2019).
12
John Perry Barlow, Selling Wine Without Bottles, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 8
(2019).
13
Written while tipsy, according to the backstory provided by Cindy Cohn,
Inventing the Future: Barlow and Beyond, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 69 (2019).
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In the first essay in this volume, though, a moving, personal
reflection on Barlow’s ideas, Cory Doctorow argues for a different
interpretation.
[C]ontext is everything: “The Net interprets censorship as damage
and routes around it” was a prescription as much as an observation.
It was uttered in the context of a nascent internet whose technical
caretakers disagreed on many ethical and technical points, but were
united in a sense of civic duty to keep the technology open and
universal and “free as in freedom.” Gilmore didn’t mean, “Stand
down everyone, we’ve built a censorship-proof internet that will
automatically maintain its integrity.” He meant, “To you, my
comrades-in-arms who toil endlessly to make our balky, wonderful
invention run, I say: the same measures that we take to re-knit our
network when a technical failure tears holes in its fabric can be
repurposed to resist censorship, to route around the nodes that have
fallen under a censor’s thrall. Our shared civic mission, heretofore
dedicated primarily to the technical task of preserving a forum for
discourse, can and should be expanded to the political task of
preserving that forum, and what’s more, the tactics that we have
mastered so thoroughly for the former will serve us in the latter.”14

The notion here is that people like Barlow and Gilmore and Brand were
writing in the context of something greater than a mere technology—a
community of technologists and activists who wanted to preserve the
aspects of the technology that promoted human flourishing and were
working to minimize those that subverted that goal.
When Barlow advocated for a free internet—“free” in all the
usefully overlapping and ambiguous senses of that word—he wasn’t
doing so because he lacked an appreciation of the risks of a
monopolized internet, or an internet that was under the thumb of a
repressive state. Rather, he did so precisely because he feared that a
globe-spanning network of ubiquitous, sensor-studded, actuating
devices that were designed and governed without some kind of
ethical commitment, without the pioneering spirit of the early
internet and its yeoman smallholders who defended it from those
who sought to dominate or pervert it, that we would arrive at a
dystopian future where the entertainment industry’s Huxleyism was
the means for realizing the nightmares of Orwell.15

In Doctorow’s view, Barlow’s repeated invocation of hope was, in the
end, a response to “peak indifference”—the moment when problems
seem so overwhelming that it is easy to give up. But he then adds a point
often missed by those who think Barlow was a naïve utopian. “You don't
14
15

Cory Doctorow, Barlow’s Legacy, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 61, 62 (2019).
Id.

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

42

found an organization like the Electronic Frontier Foundation because
you are sanguine about the future of the internet: you do so because your
hope for an amazing, open future is haunted by terror of a network
suborned for the purposes of spying and control.”16 Those among us, like
me, who are not one of the founders of the nation’s premier digital civil
liberties organization, please raise your hands. Collectively, we may need
to work on our definition of “naïve.”
That theme is picked up by Cindy Cohn, the Executive Director
of that very organization.
Since Barlow’s death, I’ve spent a lot of time trying to ensure
that the straw men who have Barlow’s face taped to them don’t
overshadow the actual man . . . .
To be fair, the real Barlow definitely was an optimist and he
loved all attention, positive or negative. You could argue that he
sometimes pasted his own face on that straw man. Especially in the
Declaration, his language was expansive and visionary. You don’t
start a legal or policy argument with: “you weary giants of flesh and
steel.” You don’t seek nuance with: “I declare the global social
space we are building to be naturally independent of the tyrannies
you seek to impose on us.” In talking about the Declaration at
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) many years later, Barlow
admitted that when he stepped out of a party at Davos to write it, he
was both a little drunk and trying desperately to channel Thomas
Jefferson. So maybe some of the sweeping rebukes are just trying to
match his original bravado.17

But Cohn believes that this misses Barlow’s true project. She quotes a
2015 letter of his to the Washington Post.
I [] knew that we were building the most penetrating and total
surveillance system that could be imagined, and I was no more
comfortable with the Googles (which didn’t exist but predictably
would) who would peer out through those All-Seeing Eyes than I
was with an equally enhanced NSA, Chinese Government, or
United States Cyber Command. However, just as Alan Kay said,
“The best way to predict the future is to invent it,” I knew it’s also
true that a good way to invent the future is to predict it. So I
predicted Utopia, hoping to give Liberty a running start before the
laws of Moore and Metcalfe delivered up what Ed Snowden now
correctly calls “turn-key totalitarianism.” Which is now available to

16
17

Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
Cohn, supra note 13, at 69–70 (footnotes omitted).

43

IS THE INTERNET OVER?! (AGAIN?)

[Vol. 18

a number of secretive institutions, public and private (not that
there’s a useful distinction).18

We should have two Barlow’s. One useful for viewpointtaxonomies, the naïve libertarian set of claims that is reasonably
attributed to his own most famous essays. He did say those things, after
all, and those essays were the assigned starting point for the symposium.
The second Barlow would reflect his less famous, though more
numerous, statements that he was as afraid of private power as public,
that he was as skeptical of corporations as he was of the state.
As for his tone, Cohn describes Barlow’s utopianism as the
counterpart to EFF’s own careful, analogy-packed, legal reasoning.
I would then proceed, like a good American litigator, to tie the
liberties of the future Internet to the precedents in the founding of
the country. I would tie anonymous online speakers to Publius of
the Federalist Papers. I would tie the need for digital encryption to
the physical encryption systems used by Madison and Jefferson.
Later I would tie the fight against mass surveillance to John Otis’
fight against general warrants. Since Barlow’s assertions were
factually wrong—of course people could be held accountable for
what they did online as long as their feet touched down in the
jurisdiction of some government somewhere—I worried that he
risked us losing the civil liberties and human rights online that so
many had worked so hard to win offline.
In retrospect, we both had useful strategies for convincing
different audiences to protect freedom online. It’s just that I aimed
for the Supreme Court while Barlow aimed for the sky . . . .19

Cohn takes seriously the invitation of the symposium to look forward 20
years as well as backwards. After brainstorming with her colleagues at
EFF she tries to answer the question, ‘what do we need to do or say
today to invent the future we want?’ “[A] short answer could be that we
want to win our current fights: rein in government surveillance, protect
coders, privacy and freedom of expression, ensure neither copyright nor
overbroad criminal laws cannot squelch freedom of expression, freedom
to tinker or innovation online, and more . . . . But Barlow would want us
to go further.”20 Her answer, presented “with a light touch of Barlowstyle rhetoric,” focuses both on the dangers of state power and corporate
power, and resonates much more with the ideals of “human flourishing.”
18

Letter to the Editor from John P. Barlow to the Wash. Post (sent in response to
J. Silverman, The Internet’s First Anarchist, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 2015
(evening edition)).
19
Cohn, supra note 13, at 70–71 (footnotes omitted).
20
Id. at 75.
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We are building a civilization that empowers humans as the
users, builders and beneficiaries of technologies. Governments,
businesses, religions, cultures, communities and robots all matter,
but they all work under, and are transparent to, the bright light of
the humans they serve. We’re building a society that gives power
back to people, especially those who have been robbed of it for too
long. We unflinchingly recognize the bias and prejudices that have
forestalled equity and caused our visions of a just society to fall
short, and we use the power of technology and law to ensure those
wrongs cannot invade further into our digital societies.
We are building a world where the users have primary control
over their tools, devices and networks. Technology serves us, not
the other way around, and it treats efforts to surveil, track or profile
us as hostile measures that should be blocked. Where it cannot, we
have protected pathways—legal, technological, policy and
cultural—so that we can leave those walled gardens, panopticons
and crystal prisons to build our own new worlds.21

In his essay for this volume, A Political Economy of Utopia?,22
Yochai Benkler notes something that most commentators miss; that
Barlow’s work was not just skeptical of the state, but also of a world of
creativity defined around the commodity form.
John Perry Barlow’s two essays capture a yearning to escape
the oppressive clutches of the two most important institutional
forms in modernity: the state and market society. A Declaration of
the Independence of Cyberspace is explicitly against the modern
state. One might say, “All right, but apart from the sanitation, the
medicine, education, wine, public order, irrigation, roads, a fresh
water system, and public health, what have the Romans ever done
for us?” The Declaration reflected not only a libertarian utopia that
assumed that if only the state were to back off markets will take
care of it all, but also a left-anchored critique of the state as a
critical site of protecting the power and privilege of elites, insistence
that individual self-actualization demanded a state contained within
narrow boundaries, and a deep skepticism of all forms of authority,
as Fred Turner showed in From Counterculture to Cyberculture.
Selling Wine Without Bottles is not against markets or payment as
such, but rather a resistance to the totalizing vision of commodity
exchange as all there is . . . .23

21

Id. at 76.
Yochai Benkler, A Political Economy of Utopia, 18 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 78
(2019).
23
Id. at 78 (footnotes omitted).
22
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Benkler points out that Barlow was at least as excited about what the
network might mean for non-commodified forms of human flourishing,
quoting these lines from Selling Wine:
And then there are the inexplicable pleasures of information
itself, the joys of learning, knowing, and teaching. The strange good
feeling of information coming into and out of oneself. Playing with
ideas is a recreation which people must be willing to pay a lot for,
given the market for books and elective seminars. We’d likely
spend even more money for such pleasures if there weren’t so many
opportunities to pay for ideas with other ideas.
This explains much of the collective “volunteer” work which
fills the archives, newsgroups, and databases of the Internet. Its
denizens are not working for “nothing,” as is widely believed.
Rather they are getting paid in something besides money. It is an
economy which consists almost entirely of information.24

Adding this dimension to Barlow’s ideas shows that they cannot be
reduced to simple libertarianism. Ayn Rand was not a noted skeptic of
the commodity form. Benkler’s own magisterial body of scholarship,
which defined and tried to systematize the potential, limitations and
political economy of “commons-based peer production” has followed
exactly this line. Yet he uses this symposium to muse about the humilityinducing lessons the last twenty years have taught us. Earlier, I pointed
out that one of the most fascinating characteristics of the network was
that it was built on multiple layers and that each layer depended, in part,
on a commons. Benkler adds a note of caution, however, about assuming
that the status of something as a commons is in any way determinative of
how that resource ends up being used.
[T]he kind of optimism that typified Barlow’s writing, as well as at
least some of my own, is much harder to sustain now that we’ve
seen how the successes of the first generation of battles over the
commons have turned out.
Facebook runs over TCP/IP and WiFi. The fact that the
underlying carrier technology and the Internet Protocol are open
access commons turned out not to have been enough to preserve
people’s freedom from the power of a small number of
corporations. Both on the consumer end, like Roku, and on the
cloud services side, Linux is everywhere. The Internet of Things
could not run on anything other than FOSS and spectrum commons.
And yet, these devices are all centrally controlled, and many
function as the sensors for pervasive surveillance systems. Just as
industrial manufacturers cheerfully emitted pollutants and effluents
24

Barlow, supra note 12, at 24.
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into the commons of the air and water to externalize some of their
costs, so too are Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple finding
ways of constructing new bottlenecks above and below the open
layers, creating new toll booths and points of observation, and using
the “free” nature of the open parts of the infrastructure as low cost
input from which to then mine our “biopolitical public domain,” as
Julie Cohen puts it. 25

Benkler also notes that current events seem to call for a much larger role
for the state and do so in a way that calls into doubt the contemporary
equivalent of Barlow’s ideas, the breathless, chiliastic wittering about the
transformative power of the blockchain.26
A resurgent progressive movement is fighting hard to change the
basic narrative on how important it is to harness the state,
accountably and democratically, to play its core roles.
So this, to me, is the great challenge facing those of us who still
want to think of technological change in terms of its effects on
social relations. We need a clearer, and more fully articulated
political economy of technology. We need a better understanding of
what the state and the market are for, in the context of a genuine
three-way interaction between state, market, and commons-based
production specifically or social, nonmarket production more
generally. And we to internalize the limits of anarchism, whether of
the right or left spin. I see present debates over blockchain,
cryptocurrencies, and re-decentralizing the net, and I see in them a
rededication to the ideals that Barlow expressed so poetically. The
words are still there, but the music seems out of sync with the beat
of the times.27

In Internet Utopianism and the Practical Inevitability of Law
Julie Cohen, who Benkler quoted earlier, echoes these themes but takes
aim at cyberlaw scholarship that she believes has suffered from drinking
too deep of ideas like Barlow’s.
25

Benkler, supra note 22, at 81–82 (footnotes omitted). To be fairer to Benkler
than perhaps he is to himself, to me it seemed that his own work never presented
commons status as a sufficient condition for the range of benign outcomes he
discusses, merely as a necessary one which allowed a hitherto unlikely and
counter-hegemonic set of ideas the possibility of success.
26
One of the true architects of the internet, Vint Cerf, has a slide deck about
blockchain with one slide in it. It takes the form of a flowchart. The flowchart
box asks the question “Do I need a blockchain?” The arrow goes to a single
answer. “No.” Vinton G. Cerf, (@vgcerf), TWITTER, (Jul. 19, 2018, 9:49 AM)
https://twitter.com/vgcerf/status/1019987651301081089?lang=en. True, this is
an overstatement. But it is a nice corrective and one which, given its source,
probably deserves our attention.
27
Benkler, supra note 22, at 84.
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Cyberlaw scholarship in the Barlowian mold isn’t to blame for
the worldwide erosion of protections for fundamental rights, but it
also hasn’t helped as much as it might have. In this essay . . . I
identify and briefly examine three intersecting flavors of internet
utopianism in cyberlegal thought that are worth reexamining:
utopianism about platforms for distributed cultural and political
production (and concomitant failure to reckon with the
transformative force of informational capitalism); utopianism about
anonymity as a force for institutional disruption (and concomitant
failure to acknowledge the essential role of institutions in cabining
the human capacity for malice and mayhem); and utopianism about
the relationship between information and communication networks
and human freedom (and concomitant failure to contend with the
powerful and inherently informational mechanisms by which
existing protections for human rights are increasingly outflanked
and coopted). It has become increasingly apparent that functioning
legal institutions have indispensable roles to play in protecting and
advancing human freedom. It has also become increasingly
apparent, however, that the legal institutions we need are different
than the ones we have.28

Cohen’s solutions attempt to respond to each of those failings in turn.
She addresses the nightmare of network enthusiasts: that the very
characteristics they lauded—openness, commons-based production,
distributed architecture—might not only fail to produce positive
outcomes but (under some circumstances and on some platforms) be a
problem rather than a solution.
The results of distributed cultural and political production also
are not inevitably democracy-promoting, and predictions to the
contrary have, in retrospect, come to seem extraordinarily naïve.
The particular quality-control mechanisms that keep open source
software robust and secure and Wikipedia reliable and (mostly)
objective work far less well (or not at all) within massivelyintermediated environments that are optimized to advertiser-driven
platform revenue models. In such environments, the vaunted
“wisdom of crowds” is a scalar, not a vector. Algorithmic processes
optimized to boost click-through rates and prompt social sharing
heighten the volatility of online interactions, and surveillant
assemblages designed to enhance capabilities for content targeting
and behavioral marketing create powerful––and easily weaponized–
–stimulus-response feedback loops. The result is a sociotechnical

28
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apparatus that is also optimized for stoking outrage and deepening
preexisting political, ideological, and cultural divisions.29

Or, to put it less elegantly: reality today.
In Revisiting Barlow’s Misplaced Optimism Ben Edelman also
casts a dubious eye on Barlow’s predictions.
Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace
calls for a “civilization of the mind in cyberspace,” and he says it
will be “more humane and fair” than what governments created.
Barlow’s vision is unapologetically optimistic, easily embraced by
anyone who longs for better times to come. Yet twenty years later,
it’s easy to see some important respects in which reality fell short of
his vision. Alongside the Internet’s many pluses are clickbait,
scams, hacks, and all manner of privacy violations. Ten thousand
hours of cat videos may be delightful, but they’re no civilization of
the mind. With a bit of hindsight, Barlow’s techno-utopianism looks
as stilted as other utopianism—and equally far removed from
reality.30

Edelman faults Barlow for failing to envisage the institutions that would
bring about a better world. After listing a series of government successes,
he also suggests that the state has a much more robust role to play than
Barlow envisaged and that Barlow was wrong to lay such stress on the
Golden Rule, of “do as you would be done by.” “But the moral
suasion—and practical effectiveness—of the Golden Rule presupposes
participants of roughly equal power and status. It is no small feat to
meaningfully consider what Joe User might want from Mega Social
Network if the tables were turned and Joe owned the goliath.”31
On one level Edelman’s argument seems like a moral categoryerror. The common sense moral norm, ‘one should treat others as one
would like to be treated oneself’ does not depend on a capability
assessment. The heavyweight champion of the world could certainly beat
me up for no reason. Nevertheless, according to that norm, he is still
wrong to beat me up because he would not like to be brutalized for no
reason himself, even if it had to be by someone with a gun or an M1
tank. The same is true of the Golden Rule’s more formal instantiation in
Kantian moral theory. “Act only in accordance with that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” does
not depend on the size of my biceps, bank account or gun collection, nor
those of the counterparties with whom I deal. To my knowledge, no one
29
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in the long history of Kantian moral thought has ever suggested
otherwise. So I have to disagree on that portion of Edelman’s analysis.
The Golden Rule does not depend morally on participants of roughly
equal power and status. Indeed, its principal function as a normative
thought-primer is to force the more powerful to restrain themselves by
asking the question, “how would I like it if I were in the position of
powerless supplicant in this situation?” That is the point of the thought
exercise. With participants of roughly equal power and status there
would be much less need for the Golden Rule in the first place.
Yet on another level, Edelman has an undeniable point, albeit in
a different register. Barlow was addressing himself, as Doctorow puts it,
to the yeoman smallholders of a budding network. The moral problem
with Barlow’s argument is not that Facebook has more power than me,
and thus it is allowed—under the Golden Rule—to invade my privacy
because I cannot meaningfully threaten to invade its privacy. That just
takes us back to the normative category-error of me and the heavyweight
champion. The problem is that Facebook is a collection of contracts, not
an actual moral being. One can still apply Barlow’s framework to the
legal entity, the legal fiction, formed out of those contracts—the people
who signed them would presumably not like their privacy to be violated.
We can tell the corporation’s managers that they must act as if the norm
underlying their actions would become a universal law and there is
nothing incoherent in that command. Indeed, the justified outrage that
Edelman displays about corporate misdeeds, and his consequent criticism
of Barlow for undervaluing the role of the state, depends on exactly those
kind of moral intuitions. Still, it is more of a leap, cognitively speaking.
The Golden Rule still has moral force and normative coherence as it
confronts the corporate personality and the faceless algorithm. But, for
different reasons, neither is likely to pay it much mind. The problem is
not moral coherence, but enforcement. In the speech communities within
which algorithm or corporation are constituted, the Golden Rule either
does not exist as an internalized norm, or exists only because of
government mandates of the kind Edelman is advocating. I would restate
his argument thus: only the state has the power, status and administrative
capability to become the Kantian superego of corporations and Barlow is
wrong to neglect that fact. It is hard to deny that Edelman wins that
argument.
In that regard, Edelman points out some of the digital
achievements of the state. He points out the success the state has had in
reining in the most clear-cut violations of copyright and the progress it
has made on online scams. While Edelman thinks there is much work to
be done—whether in competition policy or cyberbullying—he takes a
longer time-frame, one that makes him cautiously optimistic.
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A century ago, the Pure Food and Drug Act sought to assure
accurate labeling, purity, and ultimately safety to products
Americans consume every day. By all accounts this seemed difficult
at the time. What stops a factory from changing its process or
ingredients when the inspector leaves? And who’s to say what
consequences a drug might entail years later[?] Yet today the FDA
achieves substantial success, and the problems of that era are
delightfully in the past.
A generation later, the GI Bill of Rights stood for the principle
that after defending the nation, a serviceman deserved a quality
education and the reliable job it would usually bring. The next
generation established Medicare—a safety net to assure that our
nation’s elderly would get sustenance and medical care befitting the
nation’s prosperity. For both of these, there were serious questions
about cost and sustainability from the outset—but the moral
imperative was clear, and the projects went forward. I never
discussed these subjects with Barlow, and so far as I know he never
wrote about them or spoke publicly about them. But each of these
programs faced genuine challenges, arguably at least as
fundamental as the technology architecture Barlow considered so
important. We should be emboldened by our prior successes and no
less willing to take on great challenges as we look ahead.32

Another cluster of essays in this volume focuses more centrally
on the past and future of digital intellectual property. In their
contribution, The Enigma of Digital Property: A Tribute to John Perry
Barlow,33 Pam Samuelson and Kathryn Hashimoto carefully assess the
legacy of Barlow’s ideas, and those of his fellow travelers, about
copyright online. Like me, they give his predictions a good grade, but
think that he underestimated the possibility that copyright law could be
changed to deal with the digital world, sometimes in ways that threatened
the freedoms Barlow cared so much about. They use as an example, the
recent lobbying over Articles 11 and 13 of the EU’s Directive on
Copyright in the Digital Single Market. Article 13, which makes online
platforms liable if copyright infringing material is uploaded to them, has
been roundly condemned.
Critics have argued that Article 13 would effectively mandate
monitoring and filtering across all platforms, violating user privacy
and free speech interests as automated systems would be obliged to
scan all content and block even legitimate, noninfringing uses of
copyrighted work such as quotations and parodies. Article 13 also
32
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33

51

IS THE INTERNET OVER?! (AGAIN?)

[Vol. 18

raises competition concerns, as it would likely favor and entrench
major existing platforms, which already have or can afford to
implement the necessary surveillance and filtering technologies,
while disadvantaging smaller and newer entrants to the market.
Dozens of European intellectual property (IP) scholars have
written articles criticizing the Article 13 filtering mandate on
various grounds, including the threat it poses for freedom of
expression on the Internet . . . In addition, Tim Berners-Lee, Vint
Cerf, and numerous other Internet pioneers signed an open letter
urging the EU Parliament to drop Article 13:
By requiring Internet platforms to perform automatic
filtering [on] all of the content that their users upload,
Article 13 takes an unprecedented step towards the
transformation of the Internet from an open platform for
sharing and innovation, into a tool for the automated
surveillance and control of its users.
More than 145 civil society organizations have expressed
opposition to adoption of Article 13, as have more than 5 million
people who signed a petition against it.34

Despite all of this, Article 13 passed. Samuelson and Hashimoto observe
that Barlow “would have been appalled at the curtailment of freedom of
expression and access to knowledge on the Internet that Articles 11 and
13 will almost certainly bring about.”35
However their view is not entirely, or even mainly, pessimistic.
They argue that artists have managed to find ways to get compensated
online, in some cases using methods that Barlow predicted, and conclude
that the real danger is that attempts to restore pre-digital levels of control
may actually threaten the attractive features of the network along with
the illicit activity.
John Perry Barlow had a vision of an economy of ideas in
which information would flow freely through the Internet ether.
While his hope that copyright would disappear in the new creative
economy is unlikely to transpire, there is some reason to hope that
policymakers will come to recognize that creative sectors of the
economy are thriving. Barlow insisted that
we have a profound responsibility to be better ancestors.
What we do now will likely determine the productivity and
freedom of 20 generations of artists yet unborn. So it is
time to stop speculating about when the new economy of
34
35
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ideas will arrive. It’s here. Now comes the hard part, which
also happens to be the fun part: making it work.
As a tribute to Barlow, let’s not screw things up by adopting
stronger copyright rules that will inhibit rather than promote the
progress of science, as the Constitution directs.36

Jessica Litman, in her article, Imaginary Bottles,37 also gives
Barlow high marks for his predictive powers about the digital
marketplace of the future.
Some of Barlow’s initial musings on the nature and value of
information seem startlingly prescient 25 years later. His prediction
that, in the near future, “information will be generated
collaboratively by the cyber-tribal hunter-gatherers of Cyberspace,”
was an eerily accurate description of Twitter. Barlow’s suggestion
that information itself was supplanting money as our dominant
currency presaged a future ruled by Google, Facebook, and
Amazon, three companies that derive much of their monetary value
from trafficking in information. He proposed that we
reconceptualize information in the networked digital environment as
more akin to a living organism than a static package of knowledge.
As a non-carbon-based life form, Barlow suggested, information
evolves, spreads, and, over time, it spoils. It creates relationships
and meaning. Some information’s value depends on exclusivity;
other information is worth more the more common it becomes.38

Like Samuelson and Hashimoto, Litman thinks that,
Barlow might have underestimated the tenacity of legacy copyright
owners. Despite significant missteps, bad bets, and massive
investment in stupid initiatives, they seem to have emerged into a
new world where, from their vantage point, the copyright rules are
startlingly similar to the rules that governed the old world, only
better. 39

When she says “better,” Litman means that, under the guise of protecting
intellectual property from a digital threat, copyright owners were able—
through technological happenstance, poorly reasoned court decisions or
legislative fiat—to extend their exclusive rights to actions that copyright
law had never previously regulated. Litman argues that this was not, as
many expected it to be, by extending their powers through encryption but
rather by taking a different approach.

36
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The key to this approach was a breathtakingly expansive
reinterpretation of the exclusive right to reproduce a work in copies,
predicated on a very broad definition of “copy.” Fans of this new
understanding maintain that whenever a work appears in the
working memory of any computer anywhere, an actionable copy
has been made, in violation of the statutory reproduction right. By
insisting, again and again, that the word “copy” had long been
understood in this broader sense, and by behaving as if they were
right about that, copyright owners were able to persuade some
courts that the copyright law, if properly interpreted, afforded them
extensive rights to control any appearance of their works over
digital networks.
The new definition requires some mental gymnastics for readers
who pay attention to statutory language. The copyright statute has,
since 1976, defined “copies” as “material objects . . . in which a
work is fixed.” Congress hasn’t revised that definition, and
copyright owners haven’t asked Congress to do so. Being attached
to a material object, though, is precisely the characteristic that
Barlow argued that digital files lack. The modern revisionist
interpretation expands the understanding of a “copy” beyond the
idea of a tangible material object to include temporary and
ephemeral instantiations. Essentially, it reads the words “material
objects” out of the statutory definition.
Over the past 20 years, this expanded meaning of “copy” has
ceased to be seen as radical. That has allowed copyright owners to
sell their wine in what I would call make-believe bottles . . . .40

And thus, over 25 years, we move from selling wine without bottles to
selling wine in imaginary bottles. All of this was accomplished, Litman
argues, without much in the way of other changes to copyright law.
Most of what was idiotic and counterproductive about the ways that
copyright law worked in 1994 is still idiotic and counterproductive
in 2019. If the purpose of copyright law is to compensate creators
for the products of their minds, it hasn’t yet come close to achieving
that goal. Oodles of money flood into the copyright system. Most of
that money is siphoned off before it reaches creators’ pockets, and
where and why the money goes where it goes is kept a closely
guarded secret. Creators across a wide swathe of fields complain of
a shocking lack of transparency . . . .
Yet Barlow’s musings about the organic and volatile nature of
information remain compelling; they seem even truer today than
they seemed 25 years ago. Remove information from its containers
and it spills. Spills spread. As different individual creators and
40
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researchers discover closely-held details of how money and rights
move through the copyright system, that knowledge may itself
transform the ways that copyright owners do business . . . . Even if
the heavily fortified legacy copyright system fails to crumble under
its own weight, a flood of newly revealed information may enable
the rest of us to piece together a truer picture of where and how the
system is failing, and what interventions might help creators to
wrest back some control, or at least some money, from the legacy
rights holders seeking to preserve the old regime.41

Jonathan Zittrain is the author of a wonderful book, The Future
of the Internet: And How to Stop It,42 that explores many of the issues in
this symposium. In that book, Zittrain argues that the openness of the
internet does indeed make it vulnerable to misuse, to spam and malware
and misinformation. Yet he argues that the cure for openness may
sometimes be more openness. Spam sites originally loaded themselves
with the words that searchers might look for, making search engines
useless. Search engines reacted by turning to so called “water hole”
algorithms, using the links created by the denizens of the network as a
form of informal peer review, thus once again elevating the real sites to
the top of search lists. Spammers responded with search engine
optimization strategies, gamed links and so on—an endless arms race in
which the open nature of the network is both disease and cure, or at least
inoculation.
In his contribution to this volume, John Perry Barlow’s Call for
Persuasion Over Power,43 Zittrain muses on copyright law and Barlow’s
comments about it, noting that even before the digital revolution,
copyright laws had strayed far indeed from a layperson’s common sense
understanding of what behavior was regulated.
A glance at the U.S. copyright code by the time of Napster
showed just how far Title 17 had quietly diverged from day-to-day
reality. The idea that singing a song aloud at a birthday party could
result in thousands of dollars in “damages” was counterintuitive, to
say the least, even as there’s legitimate rationale for the core
“performance right” within copyright. The statutory limitations to
the right are tellingly mincing, such as 17 U.S.C. § 110(6), which
establishes that notwithstanding the public performance right, there
are some limited exceptions, such as:

41
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performance of a nondramatic musical work by a
governmental body or a nonprofit agricultural or
horticultural organization, in the course of an annual
agricultural or horticultural fair or exhibition conducted by
such body or organization . . . .
(It appears to be an open question whether the first gathering by a
horticultural organization can be “annual” and thus qualify for the
exception, or if litigants must wait until the following year to see if
there is another one.)44

It was this tangled body of law that content owners tried to reformulate
in the digital age, now always with success.
Most legislative proposals stalled in Congress, and the lawsuits
against individual users were retired despite most targeted users
choosing to settle. This might suggest a victory for Barlow’s way of
thinking—a certain peace emerged that reformalized commercial
relationships around activities that, to the users, could still seem
organic. But the copyright wars didn’t see victory by one side or the
other so much as a muddling through. Today, the chaos of selfpublished Web pages, hosted on individual Web servers, has given
way to the carefully indexed homogeneity of DMCA-takedownfriendly Facebook, including the automatic monitoring of private
chat for the presence of links to file sharing sites (as they are found,
they are redacted), and Facebook’s silent tracking of all usage for
the benefit of ad targeting.
Today music and movies are much less ripped and copied freely
than they are subscribed and linked to like a utility—via one of a
handful of streaming titans like Spotify, Tidal, Netflix, or Apple—
with artists seeking to make a living from their work generally no
better off than they were before the Internet came about . . . .45

The result, Zittrain argues is a muddle, a tangled mixture of open and
closed, artist-favoring and artist-exploiting rules. He closes his article
with an ironic “synecdoche: Barlow’s A Declaration of the Independence
of Cyberspace remains free, but the authoritative version of The
Economy of Ideas (as rendered in a 1994 issue of WIRED) is . . . metered
through a paywall.”46
In their article, Dancing on the Grave of Copyright?47 Madhavi
Sunder and Anupam Chander choose what at first might seem a
44
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whimsical topic through which to approach Barlow’s ideas. They argue
that “Barlow was right about where the economy would go. He was
wrong that intellectual property would not follow.”48 Thus the subject of
their contribution to the symposium:
This essay considers IP in expressions of joy and shared meaning
online in the form of emotes, GIFS, and memes: the stuff of which
dreams are made. These aesthetic experiences bring playfulness and
humanity to the internet. Are they the proper subject of intellectual
property? Are such forms of cultural innovation and appropriation
better addressed by ethics or law?49

Barlow had predicted that the wine would float free of the bottles, that
citizens would want the experience rather than the packaging it came in.
Sunder and Chander believe he was correct, but that the law has shifted
to match the new reality, sometimes in ways that seem overly
appropriative and controlling.
Intellectual property, however, has not only survived the doom
of the information economy—it has thrived. Today, intellectual
property has fully evolved from goods to a good time. As consumer
researchers have become savvier about how to package and market
the human need for fantasy, play, imagination, and haptic
experience, areas of thought and expression once free as the air we
breathe are increasingly becoming commodified and metered fare,
regulated by licenses and royalties, requiring permission and
payment.
....
In recent writing, one of us (Sunder) has repudiated this
expansion of rights, decrying the threat to fundamentally human
activity, such as the ability to play, imagine, learn with others, and
to reference the cultural works that shape our lives and societies.
Unlike Barlow, the critique does not turn on the form in which
information is conveyed—that is, bottles or no bottles, in Barlow’s

Chander and Madhavi Sunder, Dancing on the Grave of Copyright?, 18 DUKE L.
& TECH. REV. 143, 143 (2019). I have to disagree. Indeed, in the very passage
they quote to substantiate that claim, Barlow seems to me to say the reverse, that
while dancing on the grave of copyright might seem enjoyable, it does not solve
the problems we have. “While there is a certain grim fun to be had in it, dancing
on the grave of copyright and patent will solve little, especially when so few are
willing to admit that the occupant of this grave is even deceased, and so many
are trying to uphold by force what can no longer be upheld by popular consent.”
Barlow, supra note 12, at 14 (emphasis added).
48
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parlance. Rather, the critique is premised on the nature of art itself .
. . .50

Sunder and Chander give many examples of the use of copyright law to
regulate cultural creativity on the microlevel. They conclude by using
memes to illustrate their point—and to close their article with an actual
debate in meme form. To get that, you will have to read the article.51
Peter Jaszi—who introduced me to copyright law, Ring Lardner
and a host of other fascinating subjects—has had a central role in
copyright reforms and attempted copyright reforms over the last 25
years. Most of all he has seen some of the successful campaigns to derail
the kinds of copyright expansions that Samuelson and Hashimoto
decried. In his essay for this volume, What Didn’t Happen: An Essay in
Speculation,52 he celebrates the power of inaction.
Some of the last 25 years’ most important positive developments in
copyright policy have—in fact—been negatives: the collapse of the
SOPA/PIPA bills in 2012, the congressional failure to enact
categorical and comprehensive paracopyright legislation in 1998,
and the long and ultimately successful effort (throughout the midand late-90’s) to block enactment of sui generis database protection
in U.S. law. The congress’s failure to enact term extension
legislation (despite having been greenlighted by the Supreme Court
in Eldred v. Reno) is another example.
So one minor goal of this essay is to celebrate the power of
inaction. Another is to acknowledge the pleasure of having your
predictions proven wrong. I’m happy to say that in 1995 I told a
Senate panel that a 20-year term extension would be “represent[] a
down payment on perpetual copyright on the installment plan.”
Obviously, and happily, it didn’t work out that way . . . .53

Jaszi’s point is a good one. Most of the Barlowian energy over the last 25
years has been devoted to a series of attempts to block attempts to
expand copyright law, sometimes in ways that seemed to threaten
fundamental and attractive components of the internet. Bills with
acronym names like SOPA and PIPA tried to make the web safe for
copyright, but in the process also seemed to make it safe for censorship.
Jaszi, though, focuses in particular on a series of expansions of copyright
that affect the network principally in denying to ourselves the ability to

50

Id. at 146–148 (footnotes omitted).
That comment was the academic equivalent of clickbait.
52
Peter Jaszi, What Didn’t Happen: An Essay In Speculation, 18 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 162 (2019).
53
Id. at 162–63 (footnotes omitted).
51

No. 1]

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

58

use it to share the culture of the past: copyright term extension. He
focuses on the terms of the debate.
For decades, arguments on both sides of the issue were primarily
made in what might be called a “consumerist” frame, with
crisscrossing claims about whether a more robust public domain
would (or wouldn’t) offer more conventional information goods at
lower prices. For many (or most) of that era’s public domain
advocates, myself included, engaged with the issue primarily, if not
exclusively, in similar terms. Even the heroes of the early resistance
to term extension, such as the late Professor Dennis Karjala, cast
their arguments about the costs of a longer protection period
primarily in terms of the loss to the public of specific finished
derivative works (such as motion pictures based on public domain
originals) that it might bring about—an expanded argument, to be
sure, but one with roots in the dominant consumerist rhetoric
nonetheless . . . .
This narrow, market-oriented understanding of the value of the
public domain enabled, in turn, another set of tropes, in which the
public domain was figured as a kind of information limbo in which
neglected works linger precisely because nobody owns them . . . .54

But Jaszi argues that both the culture and the terms of the debate have
changed, in precisely the way that Barlow might have predicted; because
the network actually changes the way we experience culture.
Thanks to sweeping changes in the way we think and talk about
networked digital technology, no one ever again can refer to the
Internet as a “series of tubes” without major risk of embarrassment.
What once was viewed as a delivery system is now commonly
figured as a space for virtual interaction and collaboration—in
accord with Barlow’s foundational vision. And it is this shift that
(in turn) has enabled the emergence of what was for many a whole
new way to think about the public domain: less as a repository for
disregarded cultural cast-offs and more as a rich mine of source
material. To those of us with an early inchoate sense of the
potential value inherent in the unowned, it provided a new wealth of
practical and appealing examples of why the public domain really
mattered. For others, direct experience online was a powerful
teacher in its own right . . . .
....
In an environment marked by ubiquitous high-speed Internet
connectivity, 200 million active websites, and a vast array of
information tools, the Web hasn’t brought us everything we
54
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hoped—and has brought much we might never have wished to see.
Ultimately, though, it was the Internet itself that came to the rescue
of copyright’s open spaces. In this at least, John Perry Barlow’s
organic vision of cyberspace has been realized.55

The final essay in this volume comes from Charles Nesson, one
of the creators of Harvard’s Berkman (later Berkman-Klein) Center and a
person who, like Barlow, embraced the possibilities that the network
opened up for human freedom. Nesson closes the circle on Barlow’s
Declaration by offering one of his own; A Declaration of the Mission of
University in Barlowspace.56 Nesson takes seriously the ills that the
network has unleashed or magnified, as well as the good that it has done.
He argues, in fact, that we need closed spaces as well as open ones,
curated bases of knowledge as well as free-form self-indexing ones. He
has a candidate for these closed spaces: our universities.
Universities and schools, on behalf of future generations, I ask
you to preserve space for freedom of mind into the future. Only in
such shared mindspace will human liberty of thought survive.
....
. . . [T]rust is not an inherent feature of the open net. We must find
and build trust within closed classrooms within the wider
environment of the open net. Unless the cyberspace of our future
contains interior closed spaces in which human trust and freedom of
mind can live, truth as we have known it will not survive.
....
. . . To find freedom of mind amid the enveloping surveillance and
lurking trolls of the open net has proven to be more difficult than
many expected. The game is not over. Create space for freedom of
mind NOW. Let us call it Barlowspace in his honor.57

***
There is much about the contemporary web to make one despair.
Some of it has to do with the architecture of openness. The freedom and
anonymity that empowers the dissident also protects the troll. Some of it
has to do with basic problems in human psychology. We are not as
rational as we would like to imagine ourselves and the web can be an
echo chamber in which those psychological flaws are amplified in an
endless feedback loop. Some of it has to do with regulatory mistakes we
have made. The fights over net-neutrality or Europe’s Article 13 did not
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go well. Some has to do with the ability of corporations to replace open
with closed, to move from the open web to the closed and controlling
app. Some has to do with forms of economic concentration, arguably
aided by lax antitrust enforcement, to which the web gives the additional
winner-take-all power of network effects. In all of this it is particularly
easy to lose hope, which perhaps explains the vitriol with which
Barlow’s more hopeful (and naïve) pronouncements were attacked. No
one is more bitter than the idealist who has lost his faith.
Yet to succumb to doom and gloom would be a mistake. At the
beginning of this essay I said “For all intents and purposes, the web that
is so central to every aspect of your lives today did not exist at all until
1991. Maybe 1994, if you talk about mediumly-widespread public use. It
is as if I told you that no one had thought of roads, or wheels, or air, until
25 years ago.” The converse is also true. We can see the current state of
the network as so dreadful because we have become complacent about
all of the good things it brings to our lives, our culture and our economy.
This has been the greatest democratization of communicative ability in
the history of the species. And it happened in a space of 25 years. Of
course not everything went well! Duh!
We have a long history of fearing openness: I call it cultural
agoraphobia58—the ability to see the downside of open systems,
networks and forms of communication with perfect clarity: 20-20
downside vision—and yet to be blind to the positive possibilities they
open up. This is not something new. When the Bible was translated into
the language of the laity, or the franchise opened wide, people
predicted—often accurately—the evils that would follow. Conflicting
theologies, religious schism, demagoguery and ugly fanning of mob
prejudice; it all actually happened. It happened on the network as well.
Yet, to return to the question asked by my title, no, “the internet is not
over.” It is 25 years old. Today’s travails should not make us forget what
we have gained. Honoring the life and thought of John Perry Barlow
seems a particularly fitting way to do so.
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